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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 10-1448 
 ___________ 
 
 VERNON DOUGLAS, 




 RICARDO MARTINEZ, Warden 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-01188 ) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Sylvia H. Rambo 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 9, 2010 
 Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN AND STAPLETON, Circuit Judges 
 








 Vernon Douglas appeals from the denial of his habeas corpus petition by the 
United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania.  For the reasons that 




 On May 18, 2006, Douglas was sentenced in the United States District Court for 
the Middle District of Pennsylvania to a term of life imprisonment for drug and firearm 
possession and related crimes.  A $500 felony assessment was also imposed, to be paid in 
a lump sum payment “due immediately.”
1
  Criminal Judgment 4.  On September 13, 
2006, Douglas made a payment toward his court-ordered special felony assessment in the 
amount of $25.00.  He made a second payment of $25.00 on December 12, 2006.  
Douglas made no further payments and was subsequently placed in “IFRP Refuse” status.  
On October 6, 2008, Douglas’s life imprisonment sentence was vacated and he was re-
resentenced to an aggregate term of 220 months of imprisonment and ordered to pay a 
$500 felony assessment.  No restitution or other fines were imposed.     
On June 23, 2009, Douglas filed a habeas corpus petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
2241 challenging the authority of the Federal Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) to set a payment 
schedule through its Inmate Financial Responsibility Program (“IFRP”) for the $500 
special assessment imposed by the sentencing court.  He argued that only the sentencing 
court has authority to issue orders regarding the collection of criminal fines, special 
felony assessments, and restitution, and that the BOP cannot force inmates to make 
                                                 
1
 The order of judgment further stated that: “Unless the court order has expressly 
ordered otherwise, if this judgment imposes imprisonment, payment of criminal 
monetary penalties is due during imprisonment.  All criminal monetary penalties, 
except those payments made through the Federal Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate 




payments, or impose sanctions against inmates who do not make payments via the IFRP.  
The District Court denied the petition as meritless.
2
  Douglas timely appealed.       
II. 
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We exercise plenary 
review over the District Court’s legal conclusions.  See Cradle v. United States ex rel. 
Miner, 290 F.3d 536, 538 (3d Cir. 2002).     
III.  
On appeal, Douglas argues that the BOP failed to provide him with due process 
before placing him in IFRP, in violation of his constitutional rights.
3
  He cites United 
States v. Coates for the proposition that the sentencing court cannot delegate to the BOP 
the authority to set the schedule of restitution payments.  178 F.3d 681, 685 (3d Cir. 
                                                 
2
 In its order denying Douglas’s habeas petition, the District Court also addressed 
two additional claims Douglas had raised for the first time in his objections to the 
Report and Recommendation: a challenge to the dismissal of his civil rights suit 
(M.D. Pa. No.08-cv-0140) (M.D. Pa.), and a claim that the five-year statute of 
limitation period during which the special assessment may be collected has 
expired.  Douglas does not reference either of these claims in his arguments on 
appeal.  Nonetheless, we have reviewed the record and agree with the District 
Court’s conclusion that Douglas cannot challenge the dismissal of a prior law suit 
in a § 2241 petition.  We also agree with the District Court that, because Douglas 
was re-sentenced on October 6, 2008, the five-year statute of limitations on 
collection of a special assessment has not expired, and Douglas is obligated to 
make payments until October 2013.  
3
 Douglas’s claim falls within the purview of 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which permits a  
petitioner to attack the execution of his sentence.  See Woodall v. Fed. Bureau of  
Prisons, 432 F.3d 235, 241-44 (3d Cir. 2005) (surveying Circuit law on what  
constitutes a challenge to the execution of a sentence under § 2241); see also  
Matheny v. Morrison, 307 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir. 2002) (holding that a claim  
challenging a payment schedule imposed via the IFRP concerned the execution of 
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1999); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3664.  In Coates, we held that, under the Mandatory Victims 
Restitution Act (“MVRA”), the sentencing court cannot delegate the scheduling of 
restitution payments to a probation officer or to the BOP because the fixing of restitution 
payments is an exclusively judicial act.  More recently, we held that a sentencing court 
impermissibly delegates its authority when it orders immediate payment of restitution 
with knowledge that the defendant could not make immediate payment in full.  See 
United States v. Corley, 500 F.3d 210, 226-27 (3d Cir. 2007), vacated on other grounds, 
___U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 1558 (2009).  These holdings are based on 18 U.S.C. § 
3664(f)(2), which provides that, “in consideration of” the defendant’s financial resources, 
the sentencing court “shall . . . specify in the restitution order the manner in which, and 
the schedule according to which, the restitution is to be paid.”  See Coates, 178 F.3d at 
684; Corley, 500 F.3d at 227. 
However, Douglas’s claim does not arise from an order of restitution.  Instead, he 
is challenging the BOP’s authority to set payments of his $500 special felony assessment.  
This special felony assessment is mandatory under 18 U.S.C. § 3013(a)(2)(A), and is to 
be “collected in the manner that fines are collected in criminal cases.”  18 U.S.C. § 
3013(b).  The Attorney General is responsible for the collection of criminal fines imposed 
under § 3013.  See 18 U.S.C. § 3612(c).  Thus, the collection of a special assessment is 
governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1), which provides that “[a] person sentenced to pay a 
fine or other monetary penalty, including restitution, shall make such payment 
                                                                                                                                                             
petitioner’s sentence and was correctly brought under § 2241). 
5 
 
immediately, unless . . . the court provides for payment on a date certain or in 
installments.”  However, we have not held that a sentencing court is required to set a 
schedule for the payment of a special assessment, nor have we held that § 3572(d) 
precludes a sentencing court from delegating the scheduling of such payments to the BOP 
through its IFRP program.  In fact, federal regulation 28 C.F.R. § 545.10 explicitly 
permits the BOP to “assist the inmate in developing a financial plan for meeting” his or 
her “legitimate financial obligations.”  In Coates, we held that the language of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3664(f)(2) directing the court to specify the manner and schedule of restitution 
payments “contradicts, and thus overrides, the regulations.”  178 F.3d at 685.  However, 
we have not extended that holding to special felony assessment payments which are 
governed instead by § 3572(d)(1).  See Coates, 178 F.3d at 684 (distinguishing between § 
3572(d)(1) and the affirmative requirement for the sentencing court to set a payment 
schedule under the MVRA).   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the order of the District Court.  
